[ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ] a law to appeal to, and the existence of law implies the existence of injustice; for the administration of the law is the discrimination of what is just from what is unjust. But injustice implies an act of injustice (though an act of injustice does not always imply injustice) which is taking too much of the goods and too little of the evils of life. And so we do not allow an individual to rule over us, but reason or law; for an individual is apt thus to take more for himself, and to become a tyrant. The magistrate s function, then, is to secure that which is just, and if that which is just, then that which is equal or fair. But it seems that he gets no advantage from his office, if he is just (for he does not take a larger share of the good things of life, except when that larger share is proportionate to his worth; he works, therefore, in the interests of others, which is the reason why justice is sometimes called  another s good, as we remarked before).* Some salary, therefore, must be given him, and this he receives in the shape of honours and privileges; and it is when magistrates are not content with these that they make themselves tyrants. That which is just as between master and slave, or between father and child, is not the same as this, though like. We cannot speak (without qualification) of injustice towards PLL v6.0 (generated September, 2011) http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/903 117 Online Library of Liberty: The Nicomachean Ethics what is part of one s self and a man s chattels and his children (until they are of a certain age and are separated from their parent) are as it were a part of him for no one deliberately chooses to injure himself; so that a man cannot be unjust towards himself. We cannot speak in this case, then, of that which is unjust, or of that which is just as between citizens; for that, we found, is according to law, and subsists between those whose situation implies law, i.e., as we found, those who participate equally or fairly in governing and being governed. The term just, therefore, is more appropriate to a man s relations to his wife than to his relations to his children and his chattels, and we do speak in this sense of that which is just in a family; but even this is not the same as that which is just between citizens.* PLL v6.0 (generated September, 2011) http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/903 118 Online Library of Liberty: The Nicomachean Ethics [Back to Table of Contents] 7. It Is In Part Natural, In Part Conventional. Now, of that which is just as between citizens, part is natural, part is conventional. That is natural which has the same validity everywhere, and does not depend on our accepting or rejecting it; that is conventional which at the outset may be determined in this way or in that indifferently, but which when once determined is no longer indifferent; e.g. that a man s ransom be a mina, or that a sacrifice consist of a goat and not of two sheep; and, again, those ordinances which are made for special occasions, such as the sacrifice to Brasidas [at Amphipolis], and all ordinances that are of the nature of a decree. Now, there are people who think that what is just is always conventional, because that which is natural is invariable, and has the same validity everywhere, as fire burns here and in Persia, while that which is just is seen to be not invariable. But this is not altogether true, though it is true in a way. Among the gods, indeed, we may venture to say it is not true at all; but of that which is just among us part is natural, though all is subject to change. Though all is subject to change, nevertheless, I repeat, part is natural and part not. Nor is it hard to distinguish, among things that may be other than they are, that which is natural from that which is not natural but dependent on law or convention, though both are alike variable. In other fields we can draw the same distinction; we say, for instance, that the right hand is naturally the stronger, though in any man the left may become equally strong. And so, of that which is just, that part which is conventional and prescribed with a view to a particular end* varies as measures vary; for the measures of wine and of corn are not everywhere the same, but larger where the dealers buy, and smaller where they sell. So I say that which is just not by nature but merely by human ordinance is not the same everywhere, any more than constitutions are everywhere the same, though there is but one constitution that is naturally the best everywhere. The terms  just and  lawful in each of their several senses stand for universal notions which embrace a number of particulars; i.e. the acts are many, but the notion is one, for it is applied to all alike.  That which is unjust, we must notice, is different from  an act of injustice, and  that which is just from  an act of justice: for a thing is unjust either by nature or by ordinance; but this same thing when done is called  an act of injustice, though before it was done it could only be called unjust. And so with  an act of justice (´¹º±¯É¼±); though in the latter case we rather employ ´¹º±¹¿ÀÁ¬³·¼± as the generic term, and restrict ´¹º±¯É¼± to the correction of an act of injustice. But as to the several species PLL v6.0 (generated September, 2011) http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/903 119 Online Library of Liberty: The Nicomachean Ethics of acts of justice and injustice, we must postpone for the present the inquiry into their nature and number and the ground which they cover. PLL v6.0 (generated September, 2011) http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/903 120 Online Library of Liberty: The Nicomachean Ethics [Back to Table of Contents] 8. The Internal Conditions Of A Just Or Unjust Action, And Of A Just Or Unjust Agent. Now that we have ascertained what is just and what is unjust, we may say that a man acts unjustly or justly when he does these things voluntarily; but when he does them involuntarily, he does not, strictly speaking, act either unjustly or justly, but only  accidentally, i.e. he does a thing which happens to be just or unjust.* For whether an act is or is not to be called an act of injustice (or of justice) depends upon whether it is voluntary or involuntary; for if it be voluntary the agent is blamed, and at the same time the act becomes an act of injustice: so something unjust may be done, and yet it may not be an act of injustice, i.e. if this condition of voluntariness be absent. By a voluntary act I mean, as I explained before, anything which, being within the doer s control, is done knowingly (i.e. with knowledge of the person, the instrument, and the result; e.g. the person whom and the instrument with which he is striking, and the effect of the blow), without the intervention at any point of accident or constraint; e.g. if another take your hand and with it strike a third person, that is not a voluntary act of yours, for it was not within your control; again, the man you strike may be your [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ] zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl blacksoulman.xlx.pl